Structurally strong, cyclically squeezed: inflation at 4.82% (3rd month above target, monsoon-driven), rupee at a record weak ~96/USD, 10Y G-sec just broke 7% on RBI liquidity draining after the FCNR(B) inflow — but the government just cut its FY27 borrowing programme by ₹1.2 lakh crore on stronger tax and RBI-dividend revenue, which pulls the other way on yields. Two forces on the same curve, not one clean story. Nifty is cheap on a 10-year basis (~19.7x) but still saw outflows because India has no seat at the AI/data-centre table driving the US, Taiwan and Korea higher.→ full detail, §3

Long PFC as a levered proxy on India's power-capex buildout (AI data-centres, ~8GW capacity by 2030), hedged against rate risk via a short in rate-sensitive NBFCs or India rate futures, sized alongside Power Grid to diversify financing-risk vs. transmission-toll-booth risk.→ full detail, §3.9

Speech repriced hike odds up → real yields rise → opportunity cost of holding non-yielding gold rises → gold sells off; the dollar firms on the same repricing, independently pressuring gold (dollar-priced) and EM currencies like the rupee. We watched this exact chain: Warsh's 28 Aug speech, the 16 Sep hike, gold falling from its January highs.→ full detail, §2

Less competition for savings against corporate borrowers and banks — G-sec yields are the risk-free base every other rate in the economy is priced off, so less supply eases the whole curve and cheapens private financing (less "crowding out"). Caveat: this matters most when the economy is near full capacity; with slack, government borrowing can be absorbed without much yield impact, and public capex can crowd private investment in instead.→ full detail, §3.2

Mainly through credibility — a lower deficit improves fiscal optics and the sovereign risk premium, which is currency-supportive. The direct mechanical link is weaker than people assume, because India's G-sec market is domestically funded, not externally — and lower yields from less bond supply can slightly reduce FPI debt inflows (lower carry), which cuts the other way. Net: supportive, but through credibility and growth, not a straight-line mechanism.→ full detail, §3.2

From 15 Oct, a 0.4% MDR applies to P2M (merchant) UPI transactions above ₹2,000, capped at ₹300 for ₹75,000+ — P2P transfers stay free. Small point in growth terms, but a clean example of the government re-pricing a subsidised public rail rather than running it at zero revenue indefinitely — same instinct as the borrowing cut and the redesigned urea policy.→ full detail, §3.6

Same global backdrop (firm dollar, hawkish Fed) — opposite outcomes, because the underlying balance of payments is opposite. China: large trade/current-account surplus → analysts expect continued yuan strength (toward 6.65–6.90). India: twin-deficit pressure plus FPI outflows → rupee at record weakness (~96). A balance-of-payments story, not a "which central bank is better" story.→ full detail, §4.3

Domestic demand is too weak to absorb its own production, so growth leans almost entirely on exports (record $1.19tn surplus, ~1/3 of 2025 GDP growth) — fragile because it invites tariff retaliation, and compatible with domestic deflation (10 straight quarters) even as headline growth holds, because factories keep producing at export scale while nobody at home is buying.→ full detail, §4.1